Metropolitan Cities as Territorial Autonomous Entities: Just Law on Paper (1990-2014)
The idea of establishing new institutional frameworks for governing metropolitan areas in Italy has become a significant political issue, since at least the 1980s, when the first legislative proposals were submitted to the Italian Parliament I . Yet, through the 1950s, and, increasingly, in the '60s and '70s, scholars from different disciplines, especially town planners, pointed out that several policies related to urban agglomerations, such as commuting, congestion and pollution could be better addressed through new administrative entities that would integrate large urban centers and satellite towns into new units, rather than sticking with a poor and fragmented system through inter-municipal cooperation II . However, after their establishment in the 1970s, the Italian Regions with Ordinary Statutes of Autonomy had to cope with the structural inadequacy of the tools and organisational schemes provided by administrative law at that time; the delegation of functions to municipalities and provinces occurred without any real chance of taking into account territorial, economic and social differences at their core (former Article 118 IC).
For a long time, therefore, inter-municipal co-operation rather than the creation of new local government units was the only tool for addressing metropolitan problems III .
A first legislative reference to metropolitan cities as new territorial entities can be traced back to State Law No. 142/1990 , which marked a relevant step towards the recognition of the principle of differentiation in structuring the Italian local government system. Until that time decentralised administrative authorities were structured following the principle of uniformity, whereby they ought to be charged with the same administrative tasks and endowed with the same organizational rules across the whole country (former Article 128 IC) IV . Homogeneity and uniformity, rooted in the Napoleonic model of public administration, were progressively abandoned in favor of differentiation, thereby enabling the establishment of different kinds of local authorities carrying out different tasks according to different rules in different areas of the territory of the Republic. As such, the principle of differentiation was conceived as a decisive means for fostering institutional pluralism and therefore also to promote local autonomy, as required by Article 5 IC. E -7 principle (Article 1, § 11, lett. b) Delrio Law). In particular, metropolitan cities are endowed with a very broad statutory autonomy enabling them (Article 1, § 57 Delrio Law) to discharge administrative functions on a more flexible basis (Article 1, § 57 Delrio Law). On these grounds, metropolitan cities can establish various 'homogenous areas' (zone omogenee) for carrying out given administrative functions due to specific territorial conformation specificities (e.g. for mountainous areas). These areas are not new local authorities, but rather geographical subdivisions in which tasks could be fulfilled in a more efficient and effective way by aggregations of municipalities or consortia of municipalities. For this purpose, specific bodies coordinating with the bodies of the metropolitan city will be set up following a possible agreement with the corresponding Region (Article 1, § 11, lett. c) Delrio Law), which therefore retains a role, though albeit marginal, in the organization of the territory within the metropolitan area. These 'homogenous areas' should thus serve as a means to disentangle possible overlaps of responsibilities or interferences between the city and municipalities. Pursuant to the Delrio Law, in fact, municipalities are expected to become the pivotal authorities of the Italian local government system, that is to say the only territorial authorities acting according to the general competence principle. They ought therefore to be set up in such a position as to organize provision of public services according to a bottom-up and flexible approach, and possibly continuing to rely on effective co-operational schemes they used before the establishment of the metropolitan city, such as public-private law agreements and conventions (convenzioni e accordi di programma). In contrast, the metropolitan city will no longer enjoy universal jurisdiction, but will only act according to the scope of its powers and functions as set out by law. As a newly established governing body, the metropolitan conference, an assembly of all mayors of municipalities within the metropolitan area (Article 1, § 7 and 8 Delrio Law), is aimed at further strengthening coordination between municipal and metropolitan activities. The marginal role of the Regions in this respect is confirmed by the pending constitutional amendment, which does not empower them with an exclusive legislative competence for regulating the general structure and organization of municipalities, but on the contrary In essence, metropolitan cities are territorial authorities with their own powers and functions, distinct from those of the municipalities, by which whom they can however be delegated single tasks, which are likely to be funded not only via State or regional transfers but also by means of local taxes and charges However, the residual choice for direct election, which is devolved to the metropolitan city itself, but eventually requires the approval of a new electoral law by the Parliament, is subject to the fulfillment of two alternative conditions: the main urban center within the jurisdiction of the metropolitan city should be divided up into several municipalities or, alternatively, metropolitan cities having more than three millions inhabitants (i.e. Rome, Milan and Naples, for the time being) will have to establish 'homogenous areas' within their jurisdiction.
The very purpose of these provisions was probably to soften the strong monocentric features of the metropolitan city model which appears aimed at strengthening the main urban center as a propulsive thrust, to the detriment of the other municipalities. This phenomenon is particularly striking in the metropolitan city of Turin, in which there is the highest number of municipalities (316) and where the metropolitan area extends well beyond the 'narrow' urban agglomeration up to the mountains at the borders with France, being therefore more of a 'city-region' than a metropolitan city. Therefore, it was for cases like this that the Delrio Law provided metropolitan cities with tools for disaggregating and ensuring more pluralism and democratic participation. Notwithstanding the corresponding provisions already set out in the metropolitan Statutes of Autonomy of Bologna and Genoa, the actual chances to bringing about such a shift towards a different metropolitan city model are very few at the moment, since the whole procedure is dependent upon the agreement of the most populated municipality or main urban center, which only very unlikely would accept such a break up. Only in the case of Milan, Rome and Naples it appears more likely that such a shift succeeds. A modest, yet significant attempt to enhance democratic tools wherever possible is to be found in numerous metropolitan Statutes of Autonomy envisaging prior citizens' participation and consultation at early stages for developing strategic, spatial and mobility plans, with participation drawn also at lower levels than the metropolitan one. However, given the basis of the electoral system designed by the aforementioned statutory provisions, which hardly can be deemed in conformity with Article 3, para. 2 of the European Charter of Local Self-Government XX , there is a strong argument that the metropolitan city model is based on a structurally weak form of local democracy in which peripheral entities have little representation whereas the main urban center is the dominant and pivotal actor. The two reforms, in fact, go hand in hand. The Delrio Law was conceived as a local government reform anticipating insofar as possible the constitutional amendment passed this year and that will enter into force after the aforementioned popular referendum. As a result, the Provinces were hollowed-out by means of ordinary law, whereas the structure of metropolitan cities was minimally sketched out, on the basis of the provincial model, thus leaving it up to the Regions and to metropolitan cities themselves the task as how to outline their governance model. In this article it will be brought to view that, whereas the Provinces might very well be amalgamated into new bigger entities by Regions, but will not be fully repealed, metropolitan cities will either be involved in co-operative frameworks of local governance with the corresponding Regions or turned into passive recipients of decisions issued at regional level. At present, metropolitan cities have been conferred powers and functions overlapping with regional ones, yet at the same time they are still partly subordinate to the regional government and mostly dependent upon it for funding. , which stressed the double and therefore ambiguous nature of the city as both a territorial authority with autonomous powers and as a functional entity for coordinating municipal activities. In contrast, the Statute of Autonomy of Genoa underlined that the metropolitan city represents the territory, the communities and the entities of which it is composed. The terms employed by the Statutes of Autonomy of the metropolitan cities of Milan, Rome, Venice and Florence are quite similar. In Rome, the Statute also mentions the special constitutional status of the Italian capital city and its significant role in making sure that constitutional organs and international institutions that have their seat within its boundaries can properly operate. A specific issue is how will the relationship between the metropolitan city of Rome and the capital city will be settled; in fact, while the municipality of Rome will have a special constitutional regime, the metropolitan city is already endowed with the same functions as the other metropolitan cities. In Campania, Regional Law No. E -13 is defined as an entity aimed at developing the welfare of both the territory as a whole and that of the municipalities. Only the Statute of Autonomy of Bari, by contrast, goes so far as to portrait the existence of a single local metropolitan community. Finally, it needs to be said that all Regional Laws make reference to the need for enhancing and strengthening the role of the metropolitan city as part of the regional local government system, whereas all Statutes of Autonomy highlight the need for preserving the different local identities existing within the metropolitan area, thereby constituting 'homogenous areas' as administrative subdivisions for delivering public services more efficiently and strengthening democratic participatory tools.
As to the scope of powers and responsibilities, one has to consider, on the one hand, the additional administrative functions conferred upon to metropolitan cities by Regional Laws and, on the other hand, how metropolitan cities themselves structured their governance model.
As to the former aspect, one has to further distinguish between the city's own powers and functions, and mechanisms of co-ordination of municipal activities. As mentioned, most provincial functions have been reassigned to metropolitan cities by Regions. But, moreover, also additional powers and functions have been assigned to them. In this respect, in Piedmont the Law is pretty poor, since the Region conferred upon to the metropolitan city of Turin such minor additional tasks as: consultative powers, when decisions on ancient collective rights to use natural resources in private properties or collective rights over lands (better known as usi civici) are at stake, the powers to adopt the forestry and pastures plan (piano forestale), the organisation and management of the professional education and training system, the management of certain environmentally protected areas and previous provincial functions on public transportation. However, in the case of Liguria, the corresponding Law of Liguria was even poorer, since it retained many former provincial functions at regional level and conferred few additional functions to the metropolitan city, so as that the latter merely retains a consultative role on organisation of professional education and training. In the case of Bologna, the EmiliaRomagna Region deferred to further laws the adaptation of the legislative framework to the role of the metropolitan city. Nonetheless, the Regional Law does stipulate that, for instance, the regional plan of the metropolitan rail service should be passed in agreement with the metropolitan city of Bologna. By contrast, the Law of the Lombardy Region E -14 provides for a detailed specification of fundamental metropolitan fundamental functions on spatial planning, but also on water supply and on the unified management of parks. In Lazio, spatial planning extends to waste disposal and mobility issues for the whole metropolitan city of Rome. In Puglia the regional legislative assembly confirmed the attribution of functions on 'active policies towards employment', whereas it deferred to a further piece of legislation a survey concerning the division of responsibilities on public transportation between the Region and the metropolitan city. No significant innovation can be found in Veneto for the former province and new metropolitan city of Venice, whereas in Tuscany the Region endowed the metropolitan city of Florence with consultative powers within the regional competence of landscape planning concerning its territory. It further allowed the metropolitan city to replace municipalities and pass the structural spatial plan (piano strutturale) and give instructions to them as to how implement it (piano operativo). Yet, the corresponding Statute of Autonomy is very moderate in this respect and did not implement the legislative provision. By contrast, in the metropolitan cities of Rome, Bari, Milan and Bologna the spatial plan is intended to work as a binding reference framework for municipalities within the metropolitan area and could apply specific constraints on the spatial plans issued by municipalities. The Statutes of Autonomy of Bari, Naples and Genoa, in particular, endorse the expansion of the scope of responsibilities of the metropolitan cities, since they aim towards the enactment of one single building by-law or code for the whole metropolitan area, or at least one for each 'homogenous area'. Finally, the Piedmont Region recognized and committed to the promotion of the role of 'homogenous areas' as relevant subdivisions for avoiding fragmentation of public services delivery within the metropolitan city, and in which the strategic and spatial plans could be further detailed. These areas should be designed in accordance with the Region, but, as set out in the Statute of Autonomy, when there is a given majority within the metropolitan conference 'homogenous areas' could also be designed also without its consent. In this respect yet, it ought to be remembered that Regions retain the competence of defining the areas for optimal delivery of public services (ambiti territoriali ottimali) and thus conflicts with metropolitan cities might arise.
As to the governance model, unlike the Regional Law concerning the metropolitan city E -15 mountainous areas), the metropolitan city and the Region are required to conclude ad hoc agreements (intese). In other words, the Piedmont Region favors a cautious and cooperative rather than a confrontational approach with the metropolitan city XXIV . If these agreements concern also actions and projects involving municipalities and consortia of municipalities the latter should also be able to sign the agreement. The role of coordination to be played by the metropolitan city in this respect appears therefore diminished, and bound to the ultimate will of the Region. Furthermore, a generic widespread collaboration is required where informatization and digitalization of the whole metropolitan area are concerned. The same applies to Tuscany and to the metropolitan city of Florence. In Bologna, cross-level agreement is required for measures related to the implementation of the strategic plan and is grounded in a Framework Agreement between the Region, the Provinces and the metropolitan city which was signed in January 2016. Co-operation is institutionalized from the outset also in the Regional Laws of both Tuscany and Lombardy, which foresee the establishment of a 'Conference Region-Metropolitan City'. Whereas the Statute of Autonomy of Florence is overwhelmingly silent about the relations of the city with the Region, the Statute of Autonomy of Milan stipulates that agreements with the Region ought to be concluded by the metropolitan city for any kind of action planned on its territory, including building of new infrastructures. Moreover, in Lombardy, the regional government stressed its role of overseeing the relations between the metropolitan city and municipalities located outside the metropolitan area. In general, according to the same Regional Law, relationships between municipalities within the metropolitan area, the metropolitan city of Milan and the Region are under a very detailed co-operative framework. In Campania, the Region has not set out any co-operative framework, but it apparently aims neither to delegate functions to the metropolitan city of Naples, nor to endow it with a sufficient degree of autonomy with reference to the oversight of intermunicipal co-operation within the metropolitan area. The same applies to the metropolitan cities of Bari and Venice. In Campania and Veneto, the Statutes of Autonomy of Naples and Venice only generally endorse the activation of co-operative pathways with the regional government in order to define the corresponding competences, but without providing further details.
Metropolitan cities are further subordinate to the regional administrations in the sense that they depend upon them for funding. In fact, at present they are not endowed with significant taxing powers and the Regions have been funding them using different schemes.
Another important feature of the role to be played by metropolitan cities is their possible representation in the Senate, as modified by the pending constitutional reform. In fact, the new Senate is expected to represent various territorial entities, including possibly also metropolitan cities. Therefore, it might be argued that metropolitan cities will increase their political power not only towards the corresponding Region but also towards the State, insofar as metropolitan mayors or councilors will also be sitting in the new Senate together with seventy-four regional councilors; though, this depends on the final wording of the Law regulating the election of the new members of the House. At present, the constitutional amendment mandates that, out of one hundred new members, twenty-one mayors will be appointed by the regional councils of the corresponding Italian Regions with both Ordinary and Special Statutes of Autonomy. The Law, which will be adopted as soon as the amendment enters into force, could for instance foresee a specific quota for mayors of those big municipalities in which the mayor is ex lege also the mayor of the metropolitan city XXV .
Concluding Remarks
More than twenty-five years after their first recognition by an ordinary State Law (Law No. 142/1990) , metropolitan cities have finally been established, therefore aligning the Italian legal framework to that of other major European member States, and thereby reorienting its institutional system towards the development of robust urban clusters aimed at solving connectivity problems XXVI .
Metropolitan cities are hybrid administrative entities within the Italian local government system, representing both a metropolitan community, coinciding with the old provincial one, and also the various municipalities located within the boundary of the E -17 allowed to transform provinces into new metropolitan cities, even if similar problems exist in other areas of the Republic, for instance around mid-sized cities such as Bergamo, Brescia and Verona. Here, only inter-municipal or, more appropriately, inter-provincial cooperation schemes might help in addressing connectivity issues. Therefore, one could claim that the ten metropolitan cities established by means of law by the Italian Parliament in 2014 enjoy the same institutional features, the most prominent of which is the dominant influence of the main urban center and the rather limited scope of powers and functions which matches to a large extent with that of the Provinces. As it is the case for the Provinces, the funding of metropolitan cities by State and Regions is also precarious so that its overall inadequacy, as ascertained, limited to Piedmont, by the Italian Constitutional Court [Judgments No. 188 (2015) and No. 10 (2016) ], has until now unlawfully prevented the full coverage of costs for carrying out properly their administrative functions XXVII .
At the same time, however, metropolitan cities are conceived as entities in charge of spatial, mobility and strategic planning. All three powers are expected to be used coherently and consistently with each other. Yet, whereas metropolitan spatial planning might sooner or later result in a competence of groundbreaking importance, mobility and strategic planning may have a softer impact on municipalities, being more of reference frameworks than binding legal acts. In particular, it appears that three years are is too short of a period of time for a 'strategic' plan to be in force XXVIII . Overall, metropolitan cities appear to enjoy in the first place powers aimed at avoiding fragmentation and bringing about harmonisation and simplification among different municipal rules and procedures as well as carrying out mergers and suppressions of a number of local utilities or other administrative structures (e.g. the reduction to one out of two water supply and/or sanitation public utilities within the metropolitan area of Milan or the merger of the ICT departments into one technical body within the metropolitan area of Turin or, furthermore, the appointment of one municipal secretary for both the metropolitan city and the municipality of Bologna).
In a nutshell, they are more of planners of public policies than actors fulfilling specific tasks or public services for a given territorial community ( E -18 metropolitan area, appear partly reluctant to take over the role of pivotal spatial and strategic planning actors, regional governments can play an important role in making this happen. However, together with the State, they can also make it fail. Thus far, in fact, they have been slowing down the process of empowerment of metropolitan cities (as well as of the new Provinces), by delaying the reallocation of the former provincial personnel and by denying or reducing adequate funding.
Upon confirmation of the constitutional amendment by means of popular referendum next December, the progressive 'regionalization' of the Italian local government system might be stopped and even reversed. Regions with Ordinary Statutes of Autonomy will probably enjoy less power than today when it comes to setting up and arranging their own local government systems (Gardini 2015; Sterpa 2016) , even if they will still enjoy the power to confer administrative functions to the Provinces within their -albeit more limited! -scope of legislative competence. In addition, they might be endowed by the State with the new power to pool together the existing Provinces (current Article 133, para. 1 IC will be in fact repealed), thereby being able to more consistently coerce them into cooperation in order to fulfill certain tasks and achieve economies of scale (as set out already by State Law No. 78/2015) . Yet, on the other side, the State will be conferred with the legislative competence to set out provisions concerning the general structure and organisation of 'entities governing larger areas' (enti di area vasta), i.e. the no longer constitutionalized Provinces (Article 40, para. 4) and, as mentioned, Regions will be prevented from passing legislative provisions setting out principles for the organization of inter-municipal co-operation. In this respect too, also the new Senate will have only a weak say, i.e. it will be able to provide the Chamber of Deputies with modifications proposals, but it will not enjoy any veto power (new Article 70, para. 2 IC). Furthermore, whilst still endowed with the power to establish new municipalities by means of Regional Law, Regions will not enjoy the corresponding legislative power to determine the differential organizations and structures of municipalities located under their jurisdiction and, more in generally, will not be able to depart from the legal framework designed by the Delrio Law by creating new local authorities, unless State legislation stipulates so.
Moreover, metropolitan cities will continuously enjoy a constitutional guarantee of autonomy and will be much more dependent upon the State than upon the Regions as to the regulation of their general structure and organization (even if the new Senate is fully E -19 involved in the legislative procedure accrding to new Article 70, para. 1 IC), as to how each function should be carried out and to the demarcation of their borders, as well as also being dependent upon the European Union for direct funding. In their own jurisdictions, metropolitan cities might therefore increasingly replace Regions insofar as specific responsibilities in matters of planning and inter-municipal co-operation are concerned, yet the latter will probably continue resisting this trend of hollowing-out, for instance by requiring the conclusion of specific agreements on certain issues, by giving instructions or by exercising some sort of oversight on given acts which should be coherent with those issued by the Region.
To conclude, one might argue that two years after the enactment of the Delrio Law, the practice shows that, one the one hand, institutional pluralism at local level has been No. 61 (1958) , No. 9 (1961) , No. 52 (1969 ), No. 164 (1972 ), No. 62 (1973 . So also Staderini 1989: 52 and ff. V On the various past efforts to establish metropolitan cities in the Italian legal order see Brancasi and Caretti 2010. VI Italian Constitutional Court, Judgment No. 220 (2013) , in which the Court considered that a 'structural reform' involving the reorganization of the local government system as a whole cannot be passed by government by means of a Law Decree pursuant to Article 77 of the Italian Constitution, which is suited only for passing measures under extraordinary conditions of necessity and emergence. On this judgment see Boggero 2014. VII Named after the then Minister responsible for Local and Regional Government, Graziano Delrio. VIII As for Regions with Special Statute of Autonomy, they are empowered to establish and regulate themselves metropolitan cities. In particular, Sicily set up the metropolitan cities of Palermo, Catania and Messina (Regional Law 4 August 2015, No. 15), whereas Sardinia the metropolitan city of Cagliari (Regional Law 4 February 2016, No. 2) . See: Di Maria 2016 and Riviezzo 2016. By contrast, the Friuli-Venezia Giulia Region aims at establishing the metropolitan city of Trieste after amendment of its Statute of Autonomy, which however requires a constitutional law to be passed by the Italian Parliament. IX In this respect, it ought to be born in mind that the metropolitan city has not to be confused with the municipality of the main urban center which will continue existing. So, for instance, the municipality of Turin continues existing along with the metropolitan city of Turin. 
